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In hindsight, the groundwork preceding the so-called 
“landmark” decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 
(2005), invalidating portions of the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines (the “Guidelines”) was laid long before its issuance.  
Consider, for example, the surprising resignation of former United 
States District Judge John S. Martin, who told The Associated Press 
that “Congress is mandating things simply because they want to show 
how tough they are on crime with no sense of whether this makes 
sense or is meaningful.”2 Shortly thereafter came Justice 
Kennedy’s address to the American Bar Association, during which he 
observed “the compromise that led to the guidelines led also to an 
increase in the length of prison terms. We should revisit this 
compromise.  The Federal Sentencing Guidelines should be revised 
downward.”3
Other examples abound.  In 2004, the non-profit group Families 
Against Mandatory Minimums completed a lengthy study of Arizona’s 
mandatory minimum sentencing laws and concluded that such laws fuel 
the prison overcrowding crisis, fill prisons with non-violent 
substance abusers, and cost millions of dollars while doing little 
to enhance public safety.4 That same year, the American College of 
Trial Lawyers compiled an exhaustive critique of the Sentencing 
2Guidelines concluding that the Sentencing Guidelines are 
“fundamentally flawed.”5 In similar fashion, the CATO Institute 
published a critique of federal sentencing in 2002, which likewise 
concludes that “[i]t is time to scrap the commission and its 
Guidelines, and to embark on a new age of moral judgment in 
sentencing.”6
The foregoing examples are merely illustrative; the 
authorities criticizing the Guidelines are far too many to 
mention.7 Given this, it was hardly a surprise then that the 
Supreme Court took a significant step toward declaring the 
Guidelines unconstitutional when it is issued Blakely v. 
Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).  In striking down Washington 
state’s sentencing guidelines, the Court held that “the relevant 
‘statutory maximum’ is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose 
after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose 
without any additional findings.”8 As a result, the central 
question immediately became what impact, if any, the Blakely 
decision would have on the constitutionality of the Guidelines.9
Predictably, the judiciary responded with conflicting results; 
during the interim period after Blakely, but before Booker, the 
Sixth Circuit determined that “Blakely does not compel the 
conclusion that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines violate the Sixth 
Amendment.”10 Conversely, however, the Ninth Circuit found “there 
is no principled distinction between the Washington Sentencing 
3Reform Act at issue in Blakely and the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines.”11 
The Circuit split was settled on January 12, 2005, when the 
Supreme Court concluded that the holding in Blakely applies to the 
Guidelines.12 The so-called “remedial” majority opinion further 
articulated that the Guidelines could no longer operate as 
mandatory sentencing rules.13 Instead, according to the Court, the 
Guidelines would, going forward, require a sentencing court to 
consider Guideline ranges, but permit the court “to tailor the 
sentence in light of other statutory concerns as well.”14 Under 
this new regime, a district court’s sentencing determination would 
be viewed from the standpoint of reasonableness.15 
Courts initially believed that “Booker is not an invitation to 
do business as unusual”16 and, in fact, went so far as to hold that 
any defendant sentenced pursuant to mandatory Guidelines 
constituted plain error in violation of a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment rights.17 The past year’s post-Booker jurisprudence has, 
however, reflected the judiciary’s unshakeable addiction to the 
Guidelines.18 Indeed, in contravention of Booker’s expressed 
intention to have district court’s rely almost exclusively on jury 
factfinding,19 appellate courts now consistently divest the 
discretion otherwise afforded to sentencing courts by resolving the 
applicability of sentencing enhancements,20 and examining so-called 
“acquitted conduct” to impose a penalty.21 Perhaps more 
4problematically, appellate courts have seemingly wholly ignored the 
inter-relation between the Court’s holding in Booker and its 
earlier decision in United States v. Cotton, which held that 
Apprendi “facts must also be charged in the indictment.”22 
In short, although the post-Booker legal landscape continues 
to evolve on a daily basis, the judiciary’s direction points toward 
some measure of consistency.  Part I of this Article will provide 
an overview of the history and prevailing motivations behind the 
promulgation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.  Using the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit as an illustrative example,23 
Part II will contend that, notwithstanding the supposed “far-
reaching” implications of both Blakely and Booker, the judiciary’s 
continued reliance on the “advisory” Guidelines has practically 
changed federal sentencing procedures very little in form or 
function.  In contrast, Part III examines the State of Maine’s 
sentencing scheme and its response to the Supreme Court’s 
Booker/Blakely decisions.  By arguing that Maine’s sentencing 
procedure reflects a commonsense approach to sentencing by 
affording substantial discretion to sentencing courts within the 
confines of a determinate sentencing system, the Article concludes 
by advocating a revision to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to 
reflect a mixed determinate/indeterminate sentencing system.  The 
Guidelines, however carefully crafted, have long been in need of 
substantial adjustment.  This Article proffers that, rather than 
5insisting upon their immutability, federal sentencing would do well 
to reflect upon its own history, and the evolution of its state 
counterparts.  After all, “little inconveniences in the forms of 
justice . . . are the price that all free nations must pay for 
their liberty in more substantial matters . . . .”24 
I.
The present muddled state of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, culminating in the milestone decisions of Booker and 
Blakely, has a long and subtle history.  This section does not 
purport to serve as a comprehensive guide, but instead attempts to 
provide an overview of the competing philosophies and concerns that 
have influenced the evolution of federal procedure.25 The 
recitation of the broad history of federal sentencing, contrasted 
with the relatively short history of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, bolsters the case for viewing the federal sentencing 
structure as an improving continuum, not an immutable scheme.  As 
such, improvements are still to come, and, as this Article later 
suggests, federal sentencing would be wise to look to its state 
counterparts for alternatives and potential improvements to the 
Guidelines.  
1.  An Overview of Early Sentencing.
In the early stages of federal sentencing, judges possessed 
wide discretion in the imposing of sentences.26 For nearly two-
hundred years, minimal appellate review of sentencing judge’s 
6determinations existed.27 This broad entrustment of sentencing 
discretion was a product of the termed “rehabilitative ideal” 
philosophy of sentencing.28 The approach was based on the “concepts 
of the offender’s possible, indeed probable, rehabilitation, a view 
that it was realistic to attempt to rehabilitate the inmate and 
thereby to minimize the risk that he would resume criminal activity 
upon his return to society.”29 Thus, sentencing judges and parole 
officers “were in positions to exercise, and usually did exercise, 
very broad discretion.”30 
The rehabilitative motivations fueling the broad discretion 
afforded to sentencing judges was particularly evident in the 
Supreme Court’s Williams v. New York decision.31 There, the Court 
reviewed a trial court’s sentence of death, despite a jury’s 
recommendation of life imprisonment, based upon information about 
defendant that was not presented at trial but, instead, contained 
within a pre-sentence report.32 Defendant contended that he had a 
right to confront and cross-examine information derived from 
prosecution witnesses considered in the sentencing evaluation; the 
Court disagreed.33 Affirming both the conviction and sentence, the 
Supreme Court distinguished the procedural regulations required for 
determining guilt from the procedural regulations governing 
sentencing, noting the latter was “[h]ighly relevant –- if not 
essential -– to [the sentencing judge’s] selection of an 
appropriate sentence [because sentencing judges could possess] the 
7fullest information possible concerning the defendant’s life and 
characteristics.”34 Thus, “modern concepts individualizing 
punishment have made it all the more necessary that a sentencing 
judge not be denied an opportunity to obtain pertinent information 
by a requirement of rigid adherence to restrictive rules of 
evidence properly applicable to the trial.”35 This concept of 
“individualiz[ed] punishment” worked in tandem with the “the belief 
that by careful study of the lives and personalities of convicted 
offenders many could be less severely punished and restored sooner 
to complete freedom and useful citizenship”36 -- a sentiment nothing 
short of the rehabilitative ideal.37 
2. Reform.
Beginning in the 1950s, and continuing throughout the 1960s 
and 70s, criminal justice researchers and scholars began to voice 
concerns about the indeterminate sentencing structure.38 Critics 
pointed to three fundamental concerns:  (1) the lack of success in 
accomplishing rehabilitative goals; (2) anxiety among prisoners 
resulting from uncertainty and disparity in sentencing; and (3) the 
conceptual discrepancy between the ideals of equality and the rule 
of law, exemplified by “unwarranted disparities” -– such as racial 
bias–in sentence length.39 Perhaps the most vocal critic of the 
indeterminate sentence structure was judge Marvin Frankel, who 
published a plethora of scholarship lambasting indeterminate 
sentencing as judges “[s]ubject essentially to no law.”40 
8Simultaneously, concerns about rising crime rates inspired 
advocates of tougher criminal penalties to support calls for 
sentencing reform.41 
Following revisions in several states,42 the federal government 
initiated changes in sentencing procedures with the passage of the 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (the “Act”), thereby creating the 
U.S. Sentencing Commission, which in turn, promulgated the 
Guidelines.43 Unlike the rehabilitative motivations that buoyed 
indeterminate sentencing, the Guidelines did not align itself with 
any one penal ideology.44 On the contrary, the preceding bills and 
the final Guidelines listed four generally accepted justifications 
for criminal sentencing for the sentencing court “to be 
considered[.]”45 These justifications -– retribution, deterrence, 
incapacitation, and rehabilitation -– were proffered without any 
further guidance as to the amount of weight each should be 
afforded.46 In retrospect, perhaps the most glaring omission from 
both of the new substantive state and federal sentencing laws was 
the lack of procedural sentencing laws with which to provide form 
to the newly announced substance.47 The Act did not set forth, or 
even mention, a requisite sentencing procedure, save for a few 
passing comments,48 largely rendered moot by existing statutory 
law.49 
In the mid-1980s, the Supreme Court dealt with a direct 
constitutional challenge to the revised sentencing guidelines in 
9McMillan v. Pennsylvania.50 The criminal defendants in McMillan 
challenged Pennsylvania’s sentencing guidelines, enacted in 1982, 
which imposed a five-year mandatory minimum sentence if a judge 
found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the criminal 
defendant “visibly possessed a firearm” during the commission of 
enumerated offenses.51 In upholding the guideline against the 
challenge, the McMillan Court concluded that “States may treat 
‘visible possession of a firearm’ as a sentencing consideration 
rather than an element of a particular offense,” without any 
heightened burden of proof.52 The Court further relied upon 
Williams, which constitutionally blessed judicial discretion, for 
the proposition that, “[s]entencing courts have traditionally heard 
evidence and found facts without any prescribed burden of proof at 
all.”53 Yet despite this seemingly binding precedent, the 
conceptual motivations underpinning Williams were not present in 
McMillan. Professor Douglas A. Berman aptly notes that, contrary 
to the rehabilitative threads which infused the Williams decision 
and purportedly justified broad judicial discretion, the mandatory 
minimum sentence in Pennsylvania was promulgated with the specified 
goals of “protect[ing] the public from armed criminals and [ ] 
deter[ring] violent crime . . . as well as to . . . punish[ ] those 
who commit serious crimes with guns.”54 
The constitutional approval of determinate sentencing crested 
with the Supreme Court’s 1997 decision, United States v. Watts.55 
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There, again relying on Williams, the Court upheld a federal 
guideline requiring an increase in the criminal defendant’s 
sentence if the judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
that the defendant had committed certain underlying charges, even 
if the defendant was acquitted.56 In his dissent, Justice Stevens 
criticized the majority’s reliance on Williams, noting that “its 
rationale depended largely on agreement with an individualized 
sentencing regime that is significantly different from the 
Guidelines system.”57 Moreover, according to Justice Stevens, 
“[t]he goals of rehabilitation and fairness served by 
individualized sentencing that formerly justified vesting judges 
with virtually unreviewable sentencing discretion have been 
replaced by the impersonal interest in uniformity and 
retribution.”58 
3. The Fall.
Post-Watts, determinate sentencing was not without its share 
of academic critics, yet it nevertheless appeared to have achieved 
a measure of legal permanence stemming from the foregoing 
constitutional sanctions.59 The Supreme Court had repeatedly relied 
upon judicial discretion as a justification for tolerating the 
loose procedural form of sentencing Guidelines, but had not 
conceptualized the effect the substantive change of the Guidelines 
had on that discretion.  Then, twelve years after Watts, the 
Supreme Court undertook Almendarez-Torres v. United States60 and 
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Jones v. United States,61 cases in which several of the justices 
expressed doubts about the constitutional viability of judge-
determined sentencing procedures.  Both cases involved the 
Guidelines’ potential for sentence enhancements resulting from 
judge-found facts -– prior convictions and “resulting bodily 
injury” -– respectively.62 In holding that the contested guideline 
was constitutional in Almendarez-Torres and unconstitutional in 
Jones, the Court focused its analysis on the text of the applicable 
statutes; namely, whether the judge-found fact constituted an 
element of the crime or a sentencing factor.63 Ultimately, the 
Court avoided confronting the issue in Jones by emphasizing that it 
was not adopting a constitutional rule, but merely interpreting “a 
particular federal statute in light of a set of constitutional 
concerns.”64 
Both the Almendarez-Torres and Jones Courts foreshadowed a 
shift in the constitutional treatment of determinate sentencing 
procedures.  One year later, a sharply divided Court struggled to 
reconcile its divergent ideologies when a state defendant 
challenged a New Jersey statute providing that his sentence could 
be enhanced if the sentencing court determined by a preponderance 
that “[t]he defendant in committing the crime acted with a purpose 
to intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of 
race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or 
ethnicity.”65 Deeming the statute unconstitutional, the Court 
12
announced that:  “Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any 
fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed 
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”66 Although today, with the foreknowledge of the 
Booker/Blakely decisions, the impact of the rule announced in 
Apprendi seems broad, the ruling’s impact was largely contained; 
lower federal and state courts interpreted the new rule narrowly, 
and legislatures failed to take remedial action to alter sentencing 
Guidelines and recommendations.67 Determinate sentencing became the 
programmatic, and somewhat enormous, law of the land; perhaps 
fundamental changes seemed too overwhelming an undertaking.  
The biggest shocks were still to come.  In Blakely v. 
Washington, the Court struck down a provision of the Washington 
State sentencing guidelines enhancing a defendant’s sentence based 
on the judge-found fact that the defendant’s criminal kidnapping 
involved “deliberate cruelty.”68 In a decision which echoed the 
concerns of Justice Stevens in Watts, Blakely stated that:  “when a 
judge inflicts punishment that the jury’s verdict does not allow, 
the jury has not found all the facts which the law makes essential 
to the punishment, and the judge exceeds his authority.”69 Although 
the Court stated that it expressed no opinion on the federal 
sentencing guidelines,70 the Blakely Court cast grave doubt on the 
vim of determinate sentencing legislation nationwide.  Following 
the Blakely decision, federal district and circuit courts viewed 
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the continuing vitality of the Guidelines with some skepticism and, 
according to a report of the U.S. Sentencing Commission, “no longer 
uniformly applied the sentencing guidelines.”71 
The other shoe dropped soon thereafter.  Although the Court’s 
audience anticipated the expansion of Blakely with the grant of 
expedited review in United States v. Booker72 and United States v. 
Fanfan,73 they were unprepared for the Court’s choice of remedy.  
Arguably, the holding in Blakely foreshadowed a larger role for 
juries in sentencing procedures by ensuring that all facts capable 
of enhancing a defendant’s final sentence were, in fact, proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt.74 The Booker Court even observed that 
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence “forced the Court to address the 
question of how the right to jury trial could be preserved, in a 
meaningful way, guaranteeing that the jury would still stand 
between the individual and the power of the government in the new 
sentencing regime.”75 Yet instead of increasing the role of the 
jury in determinate sentencing, the piecemeal five-justice Booker 
majority remedied the constitutional infractions present in the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines by invalidating the mandatory nature 
of the scheme, thereby making it wholly advisory.76 
4. Current Sentencing Procedure.
The current state of determinate sentencing pursuant to the 
Guidelines is an evolving enigma.  Although Part II will proffer 
that, in reality, the tide of Booker’s potential impact has largely 
14
been stemmed, perhaps even completely dammed, by the narrow 
judicial application of Booker’s holding, post-Booker jurisprudence 
has molded a “new” sentencing procedure that has reached some 
measure of rote consistency.  Booker instructs that “[t]he district 
courts, while not bound to apply the Guidelines, must consult those 
guidelines and take them into account when sentencing.”77 Thus, the 
calculation of the would-be mandatory guideline range is still the 
first step in any sentencing assessment.78 Tellingly, the Fourth 
Circuit noted that in most post-Booker cases, “a district court 
will calculate, consult, and take into account the exact same 
guideline range that it would have applied under the pre Booker 
mandatory guidelines regime.”79 Indeed, the “guideline range 
remains the starting point for the sentencing decision.  And, if 
the district court decides to impose a sentence outside that range, 
it should explain its reasons for doing so.”80 
The calculation of this “advisory” range remains rife with 
judicial fact-finding.  While holding the Guidelines scheme 
unconstitutional, Booker’s remedy nonetheless purported to 
“maintain[] a strong connection between the sentence imposed and 
the offender’s real conduct -– a connection important to the 
increased uniformity of sentencing that Congress intended its 
Guidelines system to achieve.”81 The U.S. Sentencing Commission and 
subsequent circuit case law has interpreted this guidance 
validation of judicial fact-finding with regard to a defendant’s 
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relevant conduct.82 Indeed, although defendants have protested, 
arguing that Booker required any disputed fact to be submitted to a 
jury, the circuits have now nearly unanimously held that Booker 
only proscribes judicial fact-finding that increases a defendant’s 
sentence above the statutory maximum.83 In a recent case, the Sixth 
Circuit succinctly stated:  “Booker did not eliminate judicial 
factfinding.  Instead, the remedial majority gave district courts 
the option, after calculating the Guideline range, to sentence a 
defendant outside the resulting Guideline range.”84 
II. 
Bearing the foregoing characterization in mind, Part II will 
examine the changed aspects of sentencing as exemplified by the 
Sixth Circuit.  Although the court candidly acknowledged that 
“[a]chieving agreement between the circuit courts and within each 
circuit on post-Booker issues has, unfortunately, been like trying 
to herd bullfrogs into a wheelbarrow,”85 the Sixth Circuit has 
proved to be at the forefront of Booker jurisprudence,86 and its 
disposition of Booker issues provides insight into the larger 
direction of the judiciary.  Through the specific examples of 
judicial fact-finding in the calculation of the Guidelines, the 
uniform approval of “shadow” sentences, the “rebuttable presumption 
of reasonableness” for within Guidelines sentences, and Booker’s
general effect on sentencing factors, Part II will demonstrate how 
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the realities of post-Booker application have dwarfed the potential 
impact of Booker and the promise of increased judicial discretion. 
1. Judicial fact-finding in Guidelines’ calculations.
Shortly after the issuance of Booker, the Sixth Circuit issued 
a flurry of cases attempting to distill its application to judicial 
fact-finding at sentencing.  In one of its earliest cases, United 
States v. Oliver,87 the circuit held that the district court 
erroneously imposed a sentence exceeding the maximum Guidelines’ 
range “based upon judge-found fact” and the pre-Booker sentencing 
Guidelines.88 Although the defendant in Oliver was sentenced 
pursuant to the mandatory Guidelines, the spirit of Oliver did not 
seem constricted to stake its holding on this narrower point, 
stating: “A sentencing error that leads to a violation of the Sixth 
Amendment by imposing a more severe sentence than is supported by 
the jury verdict ‘would diminish the integrity and public 
reputation of the judicial system [and] also would diminish the 
fairness of the criminal sentencing system.’”89 
Although the spirit of Oliver seemingly intimated the 
circuit’s complete disapproval of judge-found facts in post-Booker 
sentencing, subsequent cases narrowed Oliver’s sentiments 
significantly.  The Sixth Circuit quickly adopted an expansive 
notion of what comprised “facts admitted by the defendant.”  At the 
outset, the court held that facts stipulated in plea agreements 
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comprised admissions by defendants.90 The court then concluded that 
facts included in the Pre-Sentence Report (“PSR”), and not objected 
to by the defendant, constituted admitted facts for sentencing 
purposes.91 
The propriety of independent judicial factfinding, however, 
remained in doubt.  Initially, in United States v. Davis, the Sixth 
Circuit condemned post-Booker judge-found facts by holding that 
“the district court did exactly what the Supreme Court found to be 
a violation of the Sixth Amendment in Booker: the district court 
engaged in independent fact-finding which enhanced Defendant’s 
sentence beyond the facts established by the jury verdict or 
admitted by Defendant.”92 The tide quickly turned after the 
issuance of United States v. Davidson,93 wherein the Sixth Circuit 
more directly addressed whether sentencing courts may independently 
find facts to enhance a defendant’s sentence pursuant to the 
Guidelines. 
In Davidson, two defendants appealed their convictions on the 
basis of guilty pleas to the attempted manufacture of narcotics and 
possession of stolen vehicle.94 The defendants specifically 
challenged the district court’s imposition of a firearm enhancement 
to lengthen their sentence based on facts that were neither 
admitted by the defendants, nor found by the jury.95 At the outset 
of its analysis, the Davidson court acknowledged that “absent the 
judicial findings that Mrs. Davidson possessed a firearm in 
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connection with the attempt to manufacture methamphetamine . . . 
Mrs. Davidson’s sentencing range would have been substantially 
lower.”96 Although the Court correspondingly recognized Booker’s
express prohibition against the imposition of sentences based on 
such unconstitutional judicial fact-finding, it nonetheless went on 
to review the propriety of the facts found by the district court to 
support its utilization of the firearm enhancement.97 In doing so, 
the court quizzically stated that, “for purposes of determining the 
Guidelines recommendation, we continue to accept a district court’s 
factual finding that a defendant possessed a firearm during a drug 
crime unless it is clearly erroneous.”98 Thus, the court concluded, 
for purposes of determining a “non-mandatory Guidelines 
recommendation,” it would not be error for the district court to 
impose a guideline-specified “Firearm Enhancement” to defendants’ 
sentences on remand.99 
In keeping with the rationale of Davidson, the Sixth Circuit 
now routinely approves of judicial fact-finding in sentencing; 
indeed, district courts “must . . . calculate the Guideline range 
as they would have done prior to Booker.”100 Sentencing courts may 
still consider reliable hearsay in calculating the advisory 
Guidelines sentence.101 Likewise, sentencing courts may consider 
uncharged or acquitted conduct in fashioning the defendant’s 
appropriate Guidelines range, so long as the resulting sentence 
does not exceed the statutory maximum sentence.102 Thus, to the 
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extent that Booker impacted independent judicial factfinding at 
sentencing, it did so only inasmuch as to require the sentencing 
court to acknowledge that the Guidelines are now advisory, not 
mandatory.   
2. Shadow Sentences.
In discerning what factors sufficiently reflected the 
sentencing court’s awareness of the “advisory” status of the 
Guidelines, the Sixth Circuit quickly approved the 
constitutionality of so-called “shadow” sentences -– a preventative 
tactic employed by district courts in the months following Blakely 
and leading up to Booker. As a general rule, the Sixth Circuit 
vacated sentences imposed pursuant to a sentencing court’s belief 
that the Guidelines provided a mandatory sentencing scheme.103 A
handful of crafty and forward-thinking pre-Booker sentencing 
courts, however, issued two sentences:  one sentence if the 
Guidelines were upheld as constitutional and another “shadow” 
sentence in case the Supreme Court found the Guidelines 
unconstitutional.   
In United States v. Christopher, the Sixth Circuit considered 
the propriety of issuing these alternative “shadow” sentences.104 
In Christopher, the district court first adopted the pre-sentence 
report’s offense level and loss calculations, and then issued two 
identical sentences -– one treating the Guidelines as a mandatory 
sentencing scheme and the other applying § 3553(a) as the governing 
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statute.”105 Affirming the practice, the Sixth Circuit concluded 
“that when a district court imposes alternative, identical 
sentences, one under a regime in which Guidelines enhancements are 
not mandatory, the harmlessness of any Booker error is 
established.”106 
This blanket acceptance of a district court’s alternative 
sentencing declaration epitomizes the Sixth Circuit’s desire for a 
“quick-fix” to the problems created by Booker. Although, as 
discussed below, specific standards facilitate the reviewing 
court’s determination of whether a defendant’s sentence is 
“reasonable,” condoning the use of “shadow” sentences improperly 
invites that court to accept sentences devoid of any analysis from 
the sentencing court.107 
3. Reasonableness Review.
The Sixth Circuit has acceded in a recent opinion that post-
Booker, “we, along with the rest of the federal appellate system, 
have struggled to define the meaning of reasonableness review for 
sentencing purposes.”108 Pursuant to Booker’s instruction, the 
court concluded that, “when a defendant challenges a district 
court’s sentencing determination, [it is] instructed to determine 
‘whether [the] sentence is unreasonable.’”109 Accordingly, the 
circuit has separated reasonableness challenges into two arguments: 
 (1) procedural unreasonableness; i.e., the failure of a court to 
adequately consider the sentencing factors enumerated by § 3553(a), 
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and (2) the unreasonableness of the sentence imposed; i.e., the 
district court placed undue weight on one particular factor, which 
resulted in an unreasonable sentence.110 
Title 18 U.S.C. § 3553 governs both forms of reasonableness 
review.111 Pursuant to § 3553(a), a sentencing court must consider: 
(1) “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the 
history and characteristics of the defendant;” (2) the 
need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the 
offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide 
just punishment for the offense; to protect the public 
from further crimes of the defendant; and to provide the 
defendant with needed educational or vocational training, 
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most 
effective manner; (3) the kinds of sentences available; 
(4) the appropriate advisory guideline range; (5) any 
other pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing 
Commission; (6) “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence 
disparities among defendants with similar records who 
have been found guilty of similar conduct; and” (7) “the 
need to provide restitution to any victims of the 
offense.”112 
A sentencing court is charged with the careful consideration of the 
aforementioned factors to ultimately produce “a sentence 
sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the 
purposes set forth in the provision.”113 
In two early post-Booker cases, United States v. Webb and 
United States v. Jackson, the Sixth Circuit attempted to establish 
the parameters of reasonableness review pursuant to the advisory 
Guidelines.114 Both cases emphasized the comprehensive nature of 
the § 3553(a) factors; the Webb court specifically stated:  
[W]e read Booker as instructing appellate courts in 
determining reasonableness to consider not only the 
length of the sentence but also the factors evaluated and 
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the procedures employed by the district court in reaching 
its sentencing determination. Thus, we may conclude that 
a sentence is unreasonable when the district judge fails 
to “consider” the applicable Guidelines range or neglects 
to “consider” the other factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a), and instead simply selects what the judge deems 
an appropriate sentence without such required 
consideration.[115]
The circuit was, however, quick to emphasize that although a 
district court’s discussion of specific § 3553(a) factors 
facilitates appellate review, “[the Sixth Circuit] has never 
required the ‘ritual incantation’ of the factors to affirm a 
sentence.”116 Instead, the circuit reviews challenges for 
procedural unreasonableness on a case-by-case basis,117 during which 
it must be capable of engaging “in a meaningful reasonableness 
review of federal criminal sentences in accordance with Booker.”118 
Although § 3553 lists several factors, the factor that 
undoubtedly still carries the most weight is the advisory 
Guidelines range.119 Indeed, in United States v. Williams,120 the 
circuit “join[ed] several sister circuits in crediting sentences 
properly calculated under the Guidelines with a rebuttable 
presumption of reasonableness.”121 This, according to Williams, did 
not obviate the duty of a sentencing court to consider all of the 
relevant § 3553(a) factors, although, again, a “ritual incantation” 
of the factors remained unnecessary.122 The circuit proceeded to 
clarify Williams by subsequently stating in United States v. 
Foreman that “Williams does not mean that a sentence outside of the 
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Guidelines range –- either higher or lower -– is presumptively 
unreasonable.  It is not.  Williams does not mean that a Guidelines 
sentence will be found reasonable in the absence of evidence in the 
record that the district court considered all of the relevant 
section 3553(a) factors.”123 Although the Foreman court approved of 
the presumption of reasonableness afforded to within-Guidelines 
sentences, it also emphasized the importance of a district court’s 
analysis of the § 3553(a) factors alongside meaningful appellate 
review, insisting that the presumption was not “an excuse for an 
appellate court to abdicate any semblance of meaningful review.”124 
In United States v. Richardson, the Sixth Circuit continued 
the expansion of Williams.125 Reiterating “that a sentence within 
the appropriate advisory Guideline range should be credited with a 
presumption of reasonableness,” the court stated nonetheless that: 
We emphasize the obligation of the district court in each 
case to communicate clearly its rationale for imposing 
the specific sentence.  Where a defendant raises a 
particular argument in seeking a lower sentence, the 
record must reflect both that the district judge 
considered the defendant’s argument and that the judge 
explained the basis for rejecting it.  This assures not 
only that the defendant can understand the basis for the 
particular sentence but also that the reviewing court can 
intelligently determine whether the specific sentence is 
indeed reasonable.[126]
In United States v. Vonner, the Sixth Circuit restated the 
procedural principles of Williams cloaked in even broader 
language.127 There, the court reviewed a sentence where “[t]he only 
proof in the record of the district court’s consideration is the 
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district court’s statement that ‘[w]ith respect to the sentence in 
this case, the Court has considered the nature and circumstances of 
the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the 
advisory Guideline range, as well as the other factors listed in 
the 18 United States 3553(a).’”128 The circuit found the district 
court’s perfunctory analysis “unreasonable” and therefore 
admonished:  “This type of offhanded dismissal of a defendant’s 
claims provides mere lip service to the district court’s 
responsibility to carefully weigh all the facts and provide a 
defendant with a well-reasoned, well-thought-out sentencing 
decision.”129 In short, it concluded, when a defendant has raised a 
specific argument or consideration to be considered under the § 
3553(a) factors, the sentencing court must proffer an “adequate 
explanation” for its acceptance or rejection of those arguments.130 
4. The Diminished Effect.
This litany of Sixth Circuit cases illustrates several points. 
 At a minimum, the Sixth Circuit has attempted to bolster the 
continued reliance upon the Guidelines’ calculation with firm 
rhetoric, arguably establishing a measure of precedent and assuring 
more consistent expectations of the standard of review for both 
defendants and sentencing courts.  And, although Booker and Blakely 
emphasized the constitutional problem with construing the 
Guidelines as a mandatory sentencing system, the aforementioned 
reactions by sentencing courts reflect that the Guidelines continue 
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to prevent those courts from balancing determinate and 
indeterminate sentencing considerations.     
As a first step, a sentencing court must still calculate the 
Guidelines precisely as before, thereby engaging in substantial 
judicial factfinding.  If a pre-Booker sentencing court was savvy 
enough to alternatively recommend an identical-to-the-Guidelines 
shadow sentence, that sentence is readily affirmed.  Additionally, 
any sentence within the Guidelines range is afforded a presumption 
of reasonableness.  Despite the Sixth Circuit’s rhetorical efforts 
to imbue this presumption with requiring evidence of discretionary 
language, the effect remains the same:  the federal sentencing 
system remains primarily a determinate scheme buttressed by heavy 
presumptions.  This is evident in post-Booker statistics.  
According to the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s post-Booker report, 
“only one circuit court has held a properly calculated guideline 
sentence to be unreasonable,”131 and “[n]o circuit court has upheld 
a below range sentence granted on the basis of either a prohibited 
factor or the defendant’s cooperation without a government motion 
having been filed.”132 
Put simply, the judicial response to Booker has slowed any 
movement toward a more balanced determinate/indeterminate 
sentencing system and has instead redirected sentencing courts to 
rely on the applicable advisory Guidelines’ range.  Although 
notable commentaries have approved of continuing to afford the 
26
advisory Guidelines’ range a substantial amount of weight in 
sentencing determinations,133 even those commentaries have lamented 
the inherent danger in such presumptive weight:  the abdication of 
the exercise of meaningful independent judgment in favor of a pre-
determined calculation.134 
With this conundrum in mind, Part III of this paper provides 
an overview of Maine’s criminal sentencing scheme both before and 
after Booker via the example of the well-publicized case, State v. 
Schofield.
III. 
Like the federal system, Maine’s pre-Blakely/Booker sentencing 
procedure presented a dilemma identical in almost every material 
respect to that presented by the Guidelines.  Indeed, before the 
pronouncement of the Blakely and Booker decisions, Maine’s 
sentencing scheme frequently obligated sentencing judges to 
determine, by preponderance, whether a defendant’s conduct was 
sufficiently heinous to merit an enhanced sentence.  That is, 
however, the only similarity between the two sentencing systems; as 
detailed below, Maine’s response to the Supreme Court’s landmark 
decisions reflects a common sense approach that carefully balances 
several statutorily enumerated sentencing goals while 
simultaneously affording much-needed discretion to sentencing 
judges.  In doing so, Maine appropriately moved toward a more 
balanced determinate / indeterminate scheme which, unlike the 
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current federal approach, serves to adequately individualize each 
defendant’s sentence.   
1. Maine’s Statutory Sentencing Framework.
In 1976, Maine adopted its Criminal Code and thereby 
eliminated indeterminate sentences by establishing a three-part 
procedure for sentencing criminal defendants.135 Specifically, the 
three-part sentencing procedure first required a court to set the 
basic term of imprisonment “by considering the particular nature 
and seriousness of the offense as committed by the offender.”136 
Secondarily, a sentencing court had to “determine the maximum 
period of imprisonment to be imposed by considering all other 
relevant sentencing factors, both aggravating and mitigating, 
appropriate to that case.”137 “Mitigating factors may include those 
that demonstrate a low potential of reoffending, and aggravating 
factors may include those that demonstrate a high probability of 
reoffending.”138 During this second step, “the court [had to] apply 
its discretion to determine the degree of mitigation called for by 
the circumstances of the offender and the degree of aggravation 
indicated by specific factors demonstrating a high risk of 
re-offending.”139 Doing so enabled the court to “appropriately 
individualize each sentence.”140 
Finally, at step three, a sentencing court analyzed whether 
any portion “of the maximum period of imprisonment should be 
suspended and, if a suspension order is to be entered, determine 
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the appropriate period of probation to accompany that 
suspension.”141 At this third step, “the court [could] suspend a 
portion of the period of maximum incarceration when, for example, 
the court determines that society will better be protected by 
affording a period of supervised probation of an offender.”142 Not 
unlike its federal counterpart,143 any Maine sentence was 
additionally guided by the following statutorily enumerated 
“purposes”: 
1. To prevent crime through the deterrent effect of 
sentences, the rehabilitation of convicted persons, 
and the restraint of convicted persons when 
required in the interest of public safety; 
 
2. To encourage restitution in all cases in which the 
victim can be compensated and other purposes of 
sentencing can be appropriately served. 
 
3. To minimize correctional experiences which serve to 
promote further criminality; 
 
4. To give fair warning of the nature of the sentences 
that may be imposed on the conviction of a crime; 
 
5. To eliminate inequalities in sentences that are 
unrelated to legitimate criminological goals; 
 
6. To encourage differentiation among offenders with a 
view to a just individualization of sentences; 
 
7. To promote the development of correctional programs 
which elicit the cooperation of convicted persons; 
and 
 
8. To permit sentences that do not diminish the 
gravity of offenses, with reference to the factors, 
among others, of: 
 
A. The age of the victim; and  
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B. The selection by the defendant of the 
person against whom the crime was 
committed or of the property that was 
damaged or otherwise affected by the 
crime because of the race, color, 
religion, sex, ancestry, national origin, 
physical or mental disability or sexual 
orientation of that person or of the 
owner or occupant of that property.[144]
The Maine Criminal Code also established corresponding maximum 
periods of imprisonment for each class of crime.  Specifically, 
Maine’s Criminal Code set the maximum term of imprisonment for 
serious crimes, other than murder,145 and categorized them into 
Class A, Class B, Class C, Class D, and Class E.146 Years later, in 
1988, a divided Judiciary Committee proposed that the punishment 
solely for Class A crimes be doubled.147 The Committee, however, 
specified that their proposal would not apply to all Class A 
crimes; instead, the amendment would apply only to those defendants 
receiving close-to-maximum sentences for “‘the most heinous and 
violent crimes that are committed against a person.’”148 Following 
the bill’s approval, enacted at 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1252(2)(A), the 
maximum sentence for Class A crimes was increased from twenty to 
forty years.149 
2. Heading toward a Booker problem:  The promulgation of 
Maine’s two-tier sentencing for “the most heinous and 
violent crimes.” 
 
Following the promulgation of section 1252(2)(A), the Maine 
Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”) concluded, in State v. Lewis,150 that 
“the [Legislature’s] intent was to make available two discrete 
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ranges of sentences for Class A crimes.”151 Thus, ordinarily, a 
defendant who committed a Class A crime would receive a sentence 
below twenty years.152 Consistent with the language embodied by the 
1988 sentencing amendment, however, a finding by a preponderance 
that the defendant’s crime constituted one of “the most heinous and 
violent crimes committed against a person” would enable the 
sentencing court to “in its discretion consider imposing a basic 
sentence within the expanded range of twenty to forty years.”153 
Significantly, a trial court was tasked with determining whether a 
defendant’s crime merited an upper-tier sentence at the first step 
of the sentencing process; i.e., when setting the basic term of 
imprisonment.154 As a result, “[c]ircumstances of the offender, or 
other circumstances unrelated to the nature and seriousness of the 
offense, [could not] elevate the maximum period of incarceration 
beyond twenty years when the crime itself is not within the 
extended range of Class A crimes.”155 Indeed, as noted, only at 
step two was a court permitted to consider the factors peculiar to 
offending defendant.156 
With that structure in mind, sentencing judges were frequently 
required to make findings at step one to determine in which “zone” 
a Class A offender should be sentenced.157 To determine whether a 
particular defendant’s conduct was sufficiently “heinous” to merit 
an upper-tier penalty, a sentencing court was instructed to compare 
the commission of that defendant’s act to “all of the possible 
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means of committing the offenses on a scale reflecting degrees of 
seriousness[.]”158 If “defendant’s conduct would cause his offenses 
to rank high on that scale[,]” then a sentence in the upper 
quadrant of the sentencing range was appropriate.159 A sentencing 
court was invited to consider facts outside the record and,160 most 
importantly, whether the commission of defendant’s crime was 
accompanied by extreme violence or serious physical injury.161 
Notably, however, a non-violent crime could qualify for an extended 
sentence so long as it was sufficiently heinous.162 The defendant 
who possesses a litany of prior convictions could likewise receive 
an enhanced sentence.163 
With the foregoing principles in mind, the SJC has affirmed 
sentences in the upper-tier imposed upon defendants who (1) 
savagely attacked the victim with a knife and subsequently left the 
victim to die in the woods;164 (2) for two years, used alcohol, 
drugs, gifts, money, and pornography to lure and groom thirteen and 
fourteen-year-old boys into sexual relationships;165 and (3) 
possessed a criminal history including killing a prison inmate, 
injuring a prison guard, and stabbing five people during a prison 
riot.166 Conversely, the court viewed close-to maximum sentences to 
be inappropriate for (1) sexual assaults “in cases that involve 
neither a weapon, nor a heightened degree of violence, injury, 
torture, or depravity[;]”167 (2) arson committed without any 
apparent motive,168 and (3) drug sales.169 
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3. Confronting Booker: The impact of State v. Schofield.
Maine’s upper/lower tier sentencing scheme was dramatically 
reformed in State v. Schofield.170 The court’s opinion in 
Schofield, which followed the Supreme Court’s decisions in Blakely 
and Booker, addressed the constitutionality of a sentencing judge’s 
statutory power to determine, pursuant to section 1252(2)(A), 
whether a particular defendant’s conduct was sufficiently “heinous” 
to merit an upper-tier penalty.  In addition to being a watershed 
case from a legal perspective, the unique facts giving rise to 
Sally Schofield’s criminal prosecution, recounted below, sparked an 
unprecedented amount of media coverage.171 
Defendant Sally Schofield worked as a caseworker in Maine’s 
Department of Human Services (“DHS”) from the early 1990s until 
November of 2000.172 As Schofield discharged her responsibilities 
as a DHS caseworker in 1996, Christy Marr gave birth to her 
troubled daughter, Logan.173 Christy, then a teenaged mother, 
immediately had difficulty raising Logan and, as a result, Christy 
moved in with her mother.174 Her mother, however, had doubts about 
Christy’s maturity and overall ability to effectively parent 
Logan.175 Christy’s mother called DHS to report her concern; DHS 
records reflect her initial concern that “Christy can’t or won’t 
put Logan’s needs before her own.  [Christy’s mother] said that 
Christy screams and hollers at the baby all the time and handles 
her extremely roughly.”176 Those concerns culminated in the 
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removal, by DHS, of then two-and-a-half-year-old Logan into state 
custody from Christy while she was pregnant with her second 
child.177 
After the birth of her new baby girl, Bailey, Christy 
temporarily revamped her life and persuaded DHS of her fitness as a 
mother to care for both Logan and Bailey.178 Her ability care for 
Logan and Bailey, however, did not last; both children were removed 
from Christy’s care because, according to DHS, Christy became 
romantically involved with an accused sex offender who allegedly 
hit Christy in front of Logan.179 DHS therefore again removed Logan 
into state custody, this time including Bailey, and placed the pair 
in the care of their second foster mother.180 Almost immediately 
after her second placement in foster care, Logan began acting out 
by throwing angry temper-tantrums, which often included physical 
outrages.181 
Commensurate with the foster mother’s struggles with Logan’s 
behavior, Schofield, who was still employed by DHS, began to 
consider adopting a female child of her own.182 Although Schofield 
had two boys of her own, and DHS discouraged its caseworkers from 
adopting children from within the system, Schofield nonetheless 
obtained custody over Logan and Bailey in September of 2000.183 
Only a few short months after her placement with Schofield, Logan 
began exhibiting intensely verbal and physical outrages similar to 
those she displayed with her previous foster mother.184 As Logan’s 
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outbursts further intensified,185 Schofield began invoking 
“progressively longer time-out periods, which often involved 
covering Logan with a blanket, or lying on top of her while 
bargaining with Logan for the release of one limb at a time.”186 
The struggle between Schofield and Logan ended with Logan’s 
death on January 31, 2001, as a snowstorm raged outside.187 At home 
on that afternoon, Logan’s behavior intensified to such an extent 
that Schofield took Logan down the basement stairs where Schofield 
placed five-year-old Logan in a high chair behind a blanket curtain 
facing a concrete wall.188 Schofield then returned upstairs 
ostensibly to cook dinner.189 A subsequent investigation of what 
soon became a crime scene revealed that Schofield did not simply 
leave Logan in her high chair; instead, as the sentencing court 
recounted: 
[Schofield] secured Logan to the high chair by wrapping 
layers of duct tape around Logan’s torso and behind the 
back of the chair to prevent her from getting out.  To 
silence her screams she wrapped more duct tape under her 
chin, over her head and across her mouth.  Having already 
violated the [Department] rules of discipline by physical 
confinement, Ms. Schofield then left Logan to struggle 
against her bonds in isolation.[190]
All told, Schofield wrapped forty-two feet of duct tape over 
Logan’s mouth and upper lip.191 Shortly after Logan’s screams went 
silent, Schofield went to the basement to check on Logan, after 
which she called 9-1-1.192 Although Logan was rushed to the 
hospital, she was pronounced dead soon thereafter.193 
35
That night, the police interviewed Schofield, who claimed that 
Logan was not restrained in her high chair.194 Detectives, however, 
uncovered evidence to the contrary when searching Schofield’s home; 
indeed, they recovered the duct tape which Schofield removed prior 
to the arrival of medical personnel.195 Forensic tests then 
confirmed that “three layers of tape had been placed over Logan’s 
mouth and upper lip, as evidenced by a bloody froth from Logan’s 
congested lungs, with a DNA match to Logan, and tiny mustache hairs 
directly above the bloody stain . . . .”196 Although, after police 
confronted Schofield with this new evidence, she initially claimed 
that Logan tangled herself in the duct tape,197 her story ultimately 
crumbled and she was indicted for depraved indifference murder in 
violation of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 201(1)(B) (1983), and manslaughter in 
violation of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 203(1)(A).198 
Although, during Schofield’s jury-waived trial held in June 
2002, the trial court granted her motion for acquittal on the 
charge of depraved indifference murder, the court ultimately found 
Schofield guilty of manslaughter.199 At her subsequent sentencing 
hearing, the court imposed upon Schofield a sentence in excess of 
twenty years pursuant to section 1252(2)(A) because, the court 
found, Schofield’s crime was sufficiently “heinous” to merit an 
upper-tier sentence.  The court stated: 
It became a test of wills between Logan and Sally, and 
Sally Schofield was determined to win out.  She couldn’t 
accept the fact that a five-year-old Logan might get the 
best of her.  And yet despite all of her training and all 
36
of her experience and knowledge of children in foster 
care and her awareness of the rules and regulations, she 
acted recklessly when she restrained Logan in the 
basement to fight her bonds in solitude and silence. 
 
The situation developed over time, and the conduct 
leading to the actual death, however, did not happen in a 
momentary lapse.  The defendant’s conduct in restraining 
Logan recklessly led to her death.  At any time during 
the process of restraining her she could’ve closed the 
door instead of putting the gag around her.  She could’ve 
turned up the radio if she wanted to drown out the sounds 
of Logan making noise and yelling.  Putting her in 
restraints was against the rules and regulations of the 
placement.  But even if she had done that, by placing the 
duct tape around the head and as was disclosed-described 
as clamping her mouth shut, Logan had no chance. 
 
This case is most serious, and the Court believes that 
the base sentence in this case falls in the 20 to 25-year 
range.  With the enhancement called for in the death of a 
child under the age of six, the Court fixes the base 
sentence at 28 years.[200]
In the next steps of the sentencing process, the court 
declined to make any adjustment to the base sentence and thereafter 
(1) suspended eight years of the twenty-eight-year sentence,201 and 
(2) ordered Schofield to serve six years of probation following the 
completion of her prison term.202 The SJC granted Schofield leave 
to appeal her sentence.203 
On appeal, the SJC considered, in pertinent part, whether an 
upper-tier sentence determination must be made by a jury.  After 
reviewing both the Blakely and Booker decisions, the court held 
that section 1252(2)(A) could not be constitutionally applied to 
Schofield’s sentencing.  In the critical portion of its analysis, 
the court stated as follows: 
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As we have already noted, section 1252(2)(A) required a 
finding that Schofield’s crime was “among the most 
heinous crimes committed against a person” before a 
sentence exceeding twenty years could be imposed.  That 
fact was not pleaded in Schofield’s indictment as an 
element of the offense of manslaughter, was not admitted 
by Schofield, and was not determined beyond a reasonable 
doubt by the fact-finder.  For these reasons, section 
1252(2)(A) cannot be constitutionally applied without 
affording the defendant an opportunity to have the 
fact-finder of her choice, judge or jury, determine 
whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, the crime was among 
the most heinous offenses committed against a person.[204]
In thereafter approving of the use of “jury sentencing” to 
determine any fact necessary to enhance Schofield’s sentence, the 
court vacated her original sentence and remanded with instructions 
for the sentencing court to provide Schofield with “the opportunity 
for a sentencing trial before the fact-finder of her choice (i.e., 
judge or jury).”205 The court concluded by observing that, on 
remand, Schofield’s sentence may properly be enhanced only if her 
chosen fact-finder determines beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Schofield’s offense is among the most heinous committed against a 
person.206 
4. Sentencing after Schofield.
Although the court’s holding in Schofield undoubtedly affected 
defendants whose sentences were enhanced pursuant to the two-tier 
system,207 its impact was significantly limited by the legislature’s 
preemptive amendment to section 1252(2)(A) in 2004.208 At that
time, the legislature revised the language of section 1252(2)(A) to 
read that, “[i]n the case of a Class A crime, the court shall set a 
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definite period not to exceed 30 years.”209 “This legislation 
indicated in its statement of fact that it was designed to 
eliminate a ‘constitutional cloud’ created by Apprendi by
eliminating what it characterized as the two-tier system and 
replacing it with ‘a single 0- to 30-year range.’”210 Quite 
evidently ahead of its time, that amendment enabled the legislature 
to cut off the potential flood of defendants impacted by Schofield 
by wholly eliminating the two “zones” of sentencing and replacing 
it with a 0-30 year range.   
Thus, were Schofield sentenced today, the sentence court would 
be confined simply to the 0-30 range provided by revised section 
1252(2)(A).  To reach an appropriate sentence for Schofield, the 
court would continue to follow the three-step Hewey analysis.  
Accordingly, the court would (1) set a basic term of imprisonment, 
(2) consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and (3) 
determine whether any portion of the sentence should be suspended. 
 By providing such a procedure, Maine has sought to protect the 
legislature’s interest in reducing sentencing disparity at step one 
(i.e., by mandating a specific sentencing range for a particular 
class of crime), while simultaneously ensuring that each defendant 
will receive the benefit of genuine judicial discretion at step 
two. 
IV. 
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Notwithstanding its complexity, the Maine sentencing system 
provides what is, in essence, a three-step checklist for the 
sentencing court to follow.  Built into that list is, of course, a 
variety of statutorily enumerated sentencing purposes.  
Accordingly, the sentencing judge who closely adheres to each step 
appropriately individualizes each defendant’s punishment while 
simultaneously seeking to achieve uniformity in sentencing.  The 
ultimate sentence therefore reflects a balance of determinate and 
indeterminate components.  Importantly, in Maine, uniformity does 
not trump individualization; so long as the requisite “checklist” 
is adhered to, sentencing courts in Maine retain substantial 
discretion to tailor the sentence to the individual defendant.  As 
a result, a properly imposed sentence in Maine is met with 
extraordinary deference, thereby conserving judicial resources. 
Admittedly, the federal sentencing Guidelines were initially 
drafted to accomplish nearly identical goals.  Indeed, at the 
outset of their promulgation, the Guidelines were designed to 
provide district courts with at least some limited discretion.  
Under the guise of seeking to avoid inequality in sentencing, 
however, the federal appellate judiciary’s application and 
interpretation of the Guidelines has slowly divested whatever 
remaining discretion sentencing courts possessed when imposing a 
sentence pursuant to the Guidelines.  Indeed, after Booker,
sentencing courts are tacitly charged with adhering to the 
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recommended Guidelines range or risking reversal.  The result, as 
documented in Part II by reference to opinions authored by the 
Sixth Circuit, reflects a gradual shift toward a sentencing regime 
dedicated almost exclusively to determinate sentencing.   
The merits of a determinate, as opposed to an indeterminate, 
sentencing system, have long been debated.211 In sum, those who
advocate in favor of determinate sentencing contend that it 
provides equality in punishment while simultaneously limiting the 
unpredictable application of judicial discretion.212 Conversely, 
proponents of indeterminate sentencing highlight that equitable 
punishments arise not from across-the-board mandatory sentences, 
but rather from the uniform application of certain sentencing 
principles.213 Although patently divergent, the foregoing arguments 
reflect one glaring similarity:  regardless of whether one favors 
indeterminate or determinate sentencing, both camps seek to avoid 
an unwarranted disparity in sentencing.  This Article has not 
sought to advocate on behalf of either indeterminate or determinate 
sentencing but, instead, has assumed that the ultimate goal of any 
sentencing scheme is to avoid inequitable sentencing. 
 To that end, a comprehensive examination of the history of 
federal sentencing, as well as an examination of its state 
counterparts, is needed.  As discussed in Part II, the Sixth 
Circuit’s various approaches to sentencing – the presumption of 
reasonableness, shadow sentences, and judicial fact-finding for 
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enhancements – serve merely to unconstitutionally streamline 
federal sentencing procedures by distracting federal judges from 
their duty to impose individualized sentences upon every defendant 
who enters their courtroom.  To worsen matters, whatever discretion 
remains is currently being absorbed by the growing trend of 
appellate courts to reverse a sentencing court’s decision to grant 
to defendants a downward departure.214 Thus, although the current 
state of federal sentencing procedures outwardly purports to 
possess indeterminate and determinate components, the practical 
reality of federal sentencing reflects an unwavering addiction to 
the narrow ranges proscribed by the Guidelines.   
In contrast, this Article has proffered that the combination 
of the Maine legislature’s revision of the two-tiered approach 
previously endorsed by section 1252(2)(A) alongside the Sixth 
Amendment boundary imposed by the Schofield opinion serve as an 
interesting window through which to view a proposed response to the 
Supreme Court’s Blakely and Booker decisions.  Notably, that 
response differs starkly from that endorsed by the Sixth Circuit.  
Indeed, unlike the Sixth Circuit’s tacit return to pre-Booker 
sentencing procedures, Maine’s mixed determinate/indeterminate 
sentencing system marks clear constitutional boundaries for 
sentencing judges while simultaneously ensuring the 
individualization of each defendant’s sentence.   
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Further to blame is the federal judiciary’s current approach 
to reviewing sentences.  As noted, a circuit court typically 
reviews post-Booker sentences for “reasonableness.”215 The 
“reasonableness” standard of review is at best confusing and, at 
worst, an invitation to consider a panoply of additional, often 
pre-Booker,216 corresponding standards of review.217 Indeed, lying 
beneath the topical reasonableness standard exists, for example, 
(1) a de novo approach to reviewing asserted errors in the 
application of the Guidelines,218 (2) a clearly erroneous standard 
applicable to appellate challenges to a sentencing court’s 
imposition of an enhancement,219 and (3) a clearly erroneous 
standard applicable to a defendant’s acceptance of 
responsibility.220 
Grounded in the notion that the sentencing court is better 
able to evaluate the circumstances of each particular defendant,221 
the Maine Supreme Judicial Court employs a far more workable, 
albeit complex, and deferential two-step standard when reviewing 
sentences.222 Perhaps the best example of Maine’s deferential 
approach exists at the outset; indeed, a three-judge panel of the 
Supreme Judicial Court must first grant a defendant leave to review 
his or her sentence before the entire court will consider any 
asserted error in sentencing.223 Assuming discretionary leave is 
granted,224 the court reviews the lower court’s determination of the 
defendant’s basic period of incarceration for “misapplication of 
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principle.”225 In doing so, the court accords “great deference” to 
(1) “the weight and effect given by the court to those factors 
peculiar to a particular offender in its determination of the 
offender’s maximum period of incarceration[,]” and (2) “the court’s 
determination whether to suspend any portion of that maximum period 
in arriving at the final sentence imposed on the offender by the 
court.”226 Accordingly, as the court stated in State v. Hewey:
Because of the two different standards applicable in our 
review of the sentencing process, the desirability of a 
clear articulation by the trial court of its compliance 
with the three-step procedure becomes apparent. This 
articulation will aid us not only in distinguishing and 
applying the appropriate standard of appellate review, -- 
i.e., the misapplication of principle standard to a trial 
court’s determination of the basic sentence and a 
standard of considerable deference to its determinations 
of the maximum and final sentences -- but it will also 
facilitate a greater degree of uniformity in the 
sentencing process.[227]
Then, after determining that each individual step in the Hewey 
process was correctly applied, the court reviews the sentence in 
its entirety for an abuse of discretion.228 
No such process exists at the federal level.  Consequently, 
the unfortunate likely result of the federal judiciary’s erosion of 
the Booker ideals seems an unavoidable return to the pre-Booker 
discontent recounted at the outset of this Article.  Before that 
happens, we should reconsider the role of Guidelines in federal 
sentencing, and the sentencing commission would do well to examine 
the long history of sentencing in this county, as well as evolution 
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of sentencing in its state counterparts.  Rather than respond to 
the Booker decision extremely by, for example, abolishing the 
Guidelines in toto or, conversely, making them entirely 
mandatory,229 we should specifically consider reevaluating the 
weight to be accorded the Guidelines when sentencing federal 
defendants.  We should correspondingly limit undue reliance on the 
Guidelines when reviewing the actions of a sentencing court on 
appeal.  The most immediate consequence of such a proposal would, 
at a minimum, require appellate courts to abandon the “presumption 
of reasonableness” already coveted by so many circuits.  Then, from 
a long-term perspective, the judiciary should consider gradually 
moving toward a model not unlike Maine’s system.  Doing so would, 
ironically, better suit the original goals as outlined by the 
sentencing commission, better comport with the historical evolution 
of sentencing in this country and, ultimately, achieve a more 
reasonable balance between determinate and indeterminate 
sentencing.  
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130. Id. at 565. 
131. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 71, at 35 (citing 
United States v. Lazenby, 439 F.3d 928 (8th Cir. 2006)).  
132. Id. 
133. For one such commentary, note United States v. Buchanan,
449 F.3d 731, 735-41 (6th Cir. 2006) (Sutton, J., concurring).   
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134. See id. (“If I have one anxiety about the presumption, it 
is the risk that it will cast a discouraging shadow on trial judges 
who otherwise would grant variances in exercising their independent 
judgment.”). 
135. State v. Lewis, 590 A.2d 149, 150 (Me. 1991).  
136. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1252-C(1); see State v. Hewey, 622 A.2d 
1151, 1154 (Me. 1993) (noting trial court must consider, at step 
one, “‘the particular nature and seriousness of the offense without 
regard to the circumstances of the offender’” (quoting State v. 
Weir, 600 A.2d 1105, 1106 (Me. 1991))). 
137. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1252-C(2).  
138. State v. Gray, 2006 ME 29, ¶ 13, 893 A.2d 611, 616 (citing 
Hewey, 622 A.2d at 1154). 
139. State v. Weir, 600 A.2d 1105, 1106 (Me. 1991). 
140. Id.
141. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1252-C(3).  
142. State v. Hewey, 622 A.2d 1151, 1155 (Me. 1993). 
143. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).    
144. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1151.  
145. Murder is a class of crime unto itself, carrying a minimum 
sentence of twenty-five years and a maximum sentence of life in 
prison. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1251. 
146. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1252.  Under the current law, a defendant 
who commits a “Class A” may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment 
“not to exceed 30 years.”  Id. § 1252(2)(A).  Correspondingly, “[i]n 
the case of a Class B crime, the court shall set a definite period 
not to exceed 10 years[.]”  Id. § 1252(2)(B).  A “Class C” crime is 
punishable by a definite period of imprisonment “not to exceed 5 
years.”  Id. § 1252(2)(C).  A “Class D” crime is punishable by a 
period of “less than one year” while a “Class E” crime is punishable 
by a period of imprisonment “not to exceed 6 months.”  Id. § 
1252(2)(D)-(E).  
As discussed more fully below, this Paper focuses on section 
1252(2)(A) as written before the legislature’s most recent 2004 
amendment.   
147. Lewis, 590 A.2d at 151. 
148. Id. (quoting Com. Amend. A to L.D. 2312, No. H-720 (113th 
Legis. 1988)).   
149. P.L. 1987, ch. 808, codified at 17-A M.R.S.A. §§ 
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1252(2)(A), 1252-B (Supp. 1990).   
150. 590 A.2d 149, 150 (Me. 1991). 
151. Lewis, 590 A.2d at 151.  Following the issuance of Lewis,
the Legislature amended section 1252(2)(A) to incorporate the two-
tier approach.  P.L. 1995, ch. 473, § 1 (effective Sept. 29, 1995).  
152. Id. 
153. Id.; State v. Schofield, 2005 ME 82, ¶ 16, 876 A.2d 43, 48 
(noting utility of the preponderance of the evidence standard in 
sentencing).   
154. State v. Roberts, 641 A.2d 177, 179 n.3 (Me. 1994) 
(“Inherent in determining the basic period of incarceration for a 
Class A offense is establishing whether the statutory maximum 
sentence that can be imposed for that offense is twenty years or the 
extended range of forty years, and fixing the basic period of 
incarceration within that limit.”) (citing State v. Shackelford, 634 
A.2d 1292, 1295 (Me. 1993)); see State v. Cobb, 2006 ME 43, ¶ 11 
n.7, 895 A.2d 972, 976 (observing that the trial court should “have 
determined whether it would be considering a sentence in the upper 
tier before beginning the three-part Hewey analysis”). 
155. State v. Hawkins, 633 A.2d 78, 79 (Me. 1993) (emphasis 
added).   
156. State v. Hewey, 622 A.2d 1151, 1154 (Me. 1993). 
157. E.g., State v. Carr, 1998 ME 237, ¶ 5, 719 A.2d 531, 533 
(“For Class A crimes, the trial court must also decide whether the 
basic period of incarceration is within two discrete zones-the 
extended forty-year range, pursuant to 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1252(2)(A), 
or the usual twenty-year range.”) (citing Lewis, 590 A.2d at 151) 
(emphasis added).  
158. State v. Hallowell, 577 A.2d 778, 781 (Me. 1990); see 
State v. Corbett, 618 A.2d 222, 223 (Me. 1992) (“In evaluating the 
nature and seriousness of the offense we place the criminal conduct 
on a continuum for each type of offense ‘to determine which act 
justifies the imposition of the most extreme punishment.’” (quoting 
State v. St. Pierre, 584 A.2d 618, 621 (Me. 1990))); State v. 
Lilley, 624 A.2d 935, 937 (Me. 1993) (“A comparison of this case 
with other recent cases supports our conclusion that defendant’s 
sentence resulted from an error in principle and that the suspended 
portion of defendant’s final sentence is disproportionate to 
sentences for comparable offenders.”).  Given the high standard of 
appellate review for sentences, the importance of the sentencing 
court’s determination cannot be overstated.  See State v. Weir, 600 
A.2d 1105, 1106 (Me. 1991) (“[W]e accord the sentencing court great 
59
deference in weighing these [aggravating and mitigating] factors in 
order that it may appropriately individualize each sentence.”); 
accord State v. Tapley, 609 A.2d 722, 723 (Me. 1992). 
159. Id.; compare State v. Kehling, 601 A.2d 620, 624 (Me. 
1991) (“The nature of the crime committed by defendant Kehling in 
setting an apartment house afire in the early morning hours was 
sufficiently heinous and violent to justify the imposition of a 
basic sentence at the top of the upper range recognized by Lewis.”), 
with State v. Corbett, 618 A.2d 222, 224 (Me. 1992) (reversing 
defendant’s elevated sentence because although she sold one and 
one-half grams of cocaine nearby school grounds, “the sales occurred 
after school hours and minors were not involved”).    
160. State v. Gallant, 600 A.2d 830 (Me. 1991) (“In making its 
sentencing decision, the court is not limited to facts found at 
trial.”) (citing State v. Dumont, 507 A.2d 164, 166 (Me. 1986)).  
Indeed, as the Gallant court indicated, “[t]he facts contained in a 
presentence report may properly influence the court’s sentence if 
the defendant has the opportunity to challenge the report.”  Id. 
161. State v. Clark, 591 A.2d 462, 464-65 (Me. 1991) (“The 
upper quadrant of the sentencing range is reserved for offenses that 
are accomplished, for example, with extreme violence and accompanied 
by serious physical injury.”).  
162. State v. Sweet, 2000 ME 14, ¶ 18, 745 A.2d 368, 374.  In 
rejecting the theory that only violent crimes could qualify for an 
upper-tier sentence, the court stated as follows: 
 
We next address the defendants’ contention that the court 
engaged in a misapplication of principle when it found 
that the sentences met the criteria for the upper tier.  
Primarily, Sweet and Poulin argue that their conduct 
leading to the gross sexual assault charges was not 
violent, and therefore enhanced sentences were 
inappropriate.  They are correct that their conduct did 
not include forced, precipitously violent, or 
injury-producing conduct.  Rather, their method of 
obtaining victims had as its center point coercion, not 
physical violence.  Stripped to its essence, their goal 
was to create willing and eager sexual partners of 
children.  By their actions, they exposed their victims 
to an environment of sex, alcohol, and pornography.  They 
undertook these actions with boys whose ages placed them 
at the cusp of sexual development.  Their actions in this 
regard may well have created greater long-term damage to 
their victims than a violent one-time assault could have 
done.  In addition, the young victims were subjected to 
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anal penetration, attempted penetration, and a variety of 
other physically intrusive sexual activities.  We 
conclude, as did the sentencing court, that such conduct 
is sufficiently heinous that the absence of precipitous 
violence does not preclude a sentence in the upper tier. 
 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
163. State v. Cobb, 2006 ME 43, ¶ 22, 895 A.2d 972, 978 (“[T]he 
elevation into the upper tier does not require submission to a jury 
if it is based solely on prior convictions.”).  This Paper notes the 
inclusion of this category solely for the sake of completeness.  
Given that the Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466 (2000), excepts “the fact of a prior conviction” from 
the general rule that sentencing-enhancing facts must be found by a 
jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the discussion below will 
not revisit the impact of prior convictions on a defendant’s 
sentence.  E.g., United States v. Poole, 407 F.3d 767, 777 (6th Cir. 
2005) (“Booker’s holding, that the Sixth Amendment bars mandatory 
enhancements based on judicial fact-finding, does not apply to the 
‘fact of a prior conviction.’”). 
164. State v. Cooper, 617 A.2d 1011, 1016 (Me. 1992) (noting 
trial court, in enhancing defendant’s sentence, emphasized “the 
savage and brutal nature of the attack and the fact that Cooper left 
the victim to die in the woods where his open wounds became infested 
with maggots”). 
165. Sweet, 2000 ME 14, ¶ 18, 745 A.2d at 374.  
166. See Note 163, supra, and accompanying text (noting Paper 
will not discuss impact of a defendant’s criminal history on his or 
her sentence).   
167. Clark, 591 A.2d at 464. 
168. State v. Cloutier, 646 A.2d 358, 361 (Me. 1994) (“None of 
the arsons committed in this case, even taking into account that 
those committed on June 14 were successive fires that affected the 
ability of the fire departments to combat each separate fire, 
greatly increasing the risk of death and destruction for each fire 
set, were committed against a person so as to justify basic periods 
of incarceration in excess of twenty years.”), overruled on other 
grounds, State v. Berube, 1997 ME 165, ¶ 19, 698 A.2d 509, 515. 
169. E.g., State v. Babbitt, 658 A.2d 651, 654 (Me. 1995) (“The 
drug sales involved in this case, although serious offenses, cannot 
be classified as crimes of violence.”); State v. Hawkins, 633 A.2d 
78, 80 (Me. 1993) (“The drug sales involved here, although serious, 
cannot be classified as crimes of violence by any rational 
61
interpretation of legislative intent.”). 
170. 2005 ME 82, 876 A.2d 43.   
171. The articles covering the complex factual and procedural 
history of this case are far too many to mention.  For a 
representative sample, see Virginia Heffernan, Good Intentions in 
Maine Leave a Girl Dead and a Mother in Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 
2003, at E1; Meadow Rue Merrill, Foster Child’s Death Raises 
Questions in Maine, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 21, 2001, at B1; Associated 
Press, Foster Child’s Death in Maine Prompts Scrutiny of System by 
State Lawmakers, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 29, 2001, at A16.  The 
public’s fascination with the Schofield case culminated with a PBS 
special dedicated to examining the life of the victim, Logan Marr, 
and the bureaucracy that led to her death.  Frontline: Failure to 
Protect (PBS television broadcast Jan. 30, 2003).  Schofield’s name 
remains in the public eye given her decision to again challenge her 
sentence.  E.g., Gregory D. Kesich, Justices to Gauge Child-killer’s 
Sentence, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, June 3, 2006, 
http://pressherald.mainetoday.com/news/state/060603schofield.shtml; 
Gary Remal, Court to Review Schofield Case Again, KENNEBEC JOURNAL 
ONLINE, May 25, 2006, 
http://kennebecjournal.mainetoday.com/news/local/2768281.shtml.  
172. State v. Schofield, 2005 ME 82, ¶ 3, 876 A.2d 43, 45.  The 
unique facts of State v. Schofield prompted award-winning journalist 
Terrilyn Simpson to exhaustively document the events leading up to, 
and including, Schofield’s trial.  Using an independent newspaper to 
tell Schofield’s story, Simpson dedicated twenty-eight pages to 
chronicling the tragic events preceding Logan Marr’s death.  
Terrilyn Simpson, Logan’s Truth: Five-year-old Logan Marr Died While 
in the Custody of the Maine Department of Human Services, Calling 
into Question DHS Methods and Tactics, COMMON SENSE INDEPENDENT (October 
2002), available at http://www.asmainegoes.com/loganstruth.htm#Down 
(hereinafter “Logan’s Truth”).  Given the majority opinion’s 
decision to include few facts giving rise to the Schofield case, 
this Paper periodically references Simpson’s work and the PBS 
Frontline special for background details.   
173. Frontline: Failure to Protect – The Taking of Logan Marr,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/fostercare/marr/ (last 
visited July 14, 2006).   
174. Id. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. 
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178. Id. 
179. Id. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. Schofield ultimately quit her job at DHS in January 
2001.  Id.
184. Id. 
185. PBS articulately described this period of Schofield’s 
relationship with Logan as follows: 
 
As Logan’s behavior deteriorated, Sally found herself at 
a loss.  Logan would rage out of control, screaming, 
kicking, and thrashing so violently that Sally was afraid 
she would hurt herself.  Suddenly, all the confidence 
Sally had accumulated as a parent and a DHS caseworker 
seemed to vanish.  “I was supposed to be trained,” she 
told FRONTLINE.  “I was supposed to be educated. How come 
I couldn’t help her?  How come I didn’t know what to do?” 
 
Frontline: Failure to Protect – The Taking of Logan Marr, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/fostercare/marr/ (last 
visited July 14, 2006).   
186. Schofield, 2005 ME 82, ¶ 3, 876 A.2d 43, 45. 
187. Logan’s Truth at 20. 
188. Id. at 22.
189. Id. 
190. Schofield, 2005 ME 82, ¶ 4, 876 A.2d at 46 (quoting 
sentencing court). 
191. Logan’s Truth at 22.  Terrilyn Simpson described the 
events that followed the authorities’ arrival at Schofield’s home as 
follows: 
 
Wearing a pink jersey and a light-colored pair of 
overalls, Logan’s face was pale. Barefooted, one of her 
toes was bleeding, suggesting she’d struck it against the 
concrete wall she’d been left facing from the high chair 
although [investigator] Mills had no way of knowing that. 
 
When a firefighter arrived as part of the rescue 
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response, Mills carried Logan upstairs. She’d wet 
herself. Mills said the child vomited over his shoulder; 
the coroner later explained the incident as “postmortem 
regurgitation” and explained that “when people die,” they 
also frequently lose bowel and bladder control.   
 
Id. at 23.
192. Id. Schofield’s teenage son testified at trial that his 
mother actually made two trips up the basement stairs; the first, 
prosecutors believed, was to get a tool to cut the duct tape and the 
second, as discussed above, was to call 9-1-1.  Id. at 22-23.  
Prosecutors further theorized that Schofield was not simply trying 
to save Logan, but instead was “desperate” to remove the duct tape 
before calling 9-1-1.  Id. at 23.   
193. Frontline: Failure to Protect – The Taking of Logan Marr, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/fostercare/marr/ (last 
visited July 14, 2006).   
194. Id. 
195. Id. 
196. Logan’s Truth at 22. 
197. Frontline: Failure to Protect – The Taking of Logan Marr, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/fostercare/marr/ (last 
visited July 14, 2006).   
198. Schofield, 2005 ME 82, ¶ 5, 876 A.2d at 46. 
199. Id. 
200. Id. at ¶ 7, 876 A.2d at 46-47 (quoting sentencing 
transcript). 
201. Maine does not have a parole system.  Instead, sentences 
of imprisonment can be ordered to be fully served in incarceration, 
can be wholly suspended with probation, or can be split, with an 
unsuspended portion of the sentence to be served in incarceration, 
followed by a period of probation.  17-A M.R.S.A. § 1152(2).  
202. Schofield, 2005 ME 82, ¶ 8, 876 A.2d at 47. 
203. Id. ¶ 10, 876 A.2d at 47. 
204. Id. ¶ 21, 876 A.2d at 49-50. 
205. Id. ¶ 40, 876 A.2d at 54-55.  Notably, the court 
subsequently altered a portion of this paragraph.  In this 
paragraph, the court initially outlined a jury instruction, which 
the trial judge was directed to read to the jury in the event that 
Schofield, in fact, elected a jury to determine the facts necessary 
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to impose an enhanced sentence.  Id. In State v. Averill, 2005 ME 
83, 887 A.2d 519, however, the court modified a portion of the jury 
instruction.  That modification is not relevant to this Paper.   
206. Schofield, 2005 ME 85, ¶ 41, 876 A.2d at 55. 
207. E.g., State v. Averill, 2005 ME 83, 887 A.2d 519.  At the 
outset, it bears noting that the same citation to Averill reveals 
two separate opinions, the most recent of which merely revises a 
portion of Schofield.  See Note 205, supra, and accompanying text.  
The substantive Averill opinion reflects that the sentencing court 
determined that the manner in which defendant committed the sexual 
assault for which he was found guilty comprised one of the most 
heinous ways such an act could occur. Id. ¶ 4, 887 A.2d at 521.  The 
sentencing court therefore concluded that an upper-tier sentence was 
appropriate.  Id. After appealing his sentence, Averill contended 
that “he was entitled to have the issue of heinousness presented to 
the jury and was denied his Sixth Amendment rights when a sentence 
in excess of twenty years was imposed without his being given the 
opportunity to have a jury make that determination.”  Id. ¶ 7, 887 
A.2d at 521.  Citing Schofield, the SJC agreed with Averill’s 
arguments and, accordingly, remanded for resentencing.  Id. ¶ 9, 887 
A.2d at 521-22.  In doing so, the court noted that although Averill 
could constitutionally be sentenced without further fact-finding to 
a sentence of twenty-years or less, “[a] sentencing trial is 
required if the State recommends, and/or the court is inclined to 
impose, a sentence in excess of twenty years based on heinousness.” 
 Id. ¶ 10, 887 A.2d at 522; cf. State v. Miller, 2005 ME 84, 875 
A.2d 694 (holding no constitutional problem arose from judicial 
fact-finding in discretionary sentencing under distinct statutory 
provision). 
208. P.L. 2003, ch. 657, § 10 (effective July 30, 2004) 
(codified at 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1252(2)(A) (Supp. 2004)).  
209. Id.
210. Schofield, 2005 ME 85, ¶ 9 n.4, 876 A.2d at 47 (quoting 
L.D. 1844 Statement of Fact (121st Legis. 2004)). 
211. E.g., Richard S. Frase, The Uncertain Future of Sentencing 
Guidelines, 12 LAW & INEQ. J. 1, 8 (1993) (outlining the general 
arguments in favor of, and against, determinate and indeterminate 
sentencing).  
212. Accord Paula C. Johnson, At the Intersection of Injustice: 
 Experiences of African American Women in Crime and Sentencing, 4
AM. U. J. GENDER & LAW 1, 37 (1995).   
213. E.g., Daniel Weiss, California’s Inequitable Parole 
System:  A Proposal to Reestablish Fairness, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1573, 
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1605 n.79 (2005). 
214. E.g., United States v. Brown, 453 F.3d 1024, 1027 (8th 
Cir. 2006) (vacating below-guideline sentence); United States v. 
Martin, 455 F.3d 1227, 1242 (11th Cir. 2006) (same).  The recent 
numbers published by the sentencing commission are nothing short of 
staggering.  Indeed, only in 5.2% of cases are defendants receiving 
a downward departure from their applicable advisory guidelines 
range.  U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION SPECIAL POST-BOOKER CODING PROJECT: CASES 
SENTENCED SUBSEQUENT TO U.S. V. BOOKER 16 (2006), 
http://www.ussc.gov/Blakely/PostBooker_060106.pdf.  
215. As noted, the Sixth Circuit instructs that “when a 
defendant challenges a district court’s sentencing determination, 
[the Court is]  instructed to determine ‘whether [the] sentence is 
unreasonable.’”  Webb, 403 F.3d at 383.  
216. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 433 F.3d 31, 35 (1st 
Cir. 2005) (observing that despite Booker’s reasonableness standard, 
the court continues to review the district court’s interpretations 
of the legal meaning of the sentencing guidelines de novo and its 
factual findings for clear error);  United States v. Villegas, 404 
F.3d 355, 359 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that de novo standard still 
applies to determining whether the district court correctly 
interpreted and applied the sentencing guidelines); United States v. 
Arnaout, 431 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e continue to review 
the district court’s factual findings at sentencing for clear error 
and the application of those facts to the Sentencing Guidelines de 
novo.”). 
217. Confusingly, at least one court views the reasonableness 
inquiry to involve asking whether the district court abused its 
discretion in announcing sentence.  See United States v. Pizano, 403 
F.3d 991, 995 (8th Cir. 2005) (“To make the reasonableness 
determination, we ask whether the district court abused its 
discretion.”). 
218. United States v. Montanez, 442 F.3d 485, 488 (6th Cir. 
2006) (“We review legal conclusions regarding the application of 
Guideline provisions de novo.”  (citing United States v. Foreman,
436 F.3d 638, 640 (6th Cir. 2006)). 
219. United States v. Davidson, 409 F.3d 304, 310 (6th Cir. 
2005).  As discussed above, the Davidson opinion appears 
particularly problematic in light of Booker. Simply stated, the 
Davidson decision tacitly approves of the imposition of post-Booker 
sentencing enhancements based neither on facts proven to a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt, nor admitted to by the defendant.  The 
utilization of the Davidson court’s “non-mandatory Guideline 
recommendation” plainly departs from Supreme Court precedent.  
66
Indeed, regardless of the name assigned to describe the Davidson 
decision’s analysis, the result creates a tenuous Booker loophole 
allowing the backdoor utilization of unconstitutional judicial fact-
finding to support sentencing enhancements. 
220. United States v. Williams, 894 F.2d 208, 213 (6th Cir. 
1990) (“We review the district court's determination of a 
defendant’s acceptance of responsibility under a clearly erroneous 
standard.”  (citing United States v. Wilson, 878 F.2d 921, 923 (6th 
Cir. 1989))).  “Whether a defendant has accepted responsibility for 
criminal conduct is a question of fact, and the district court’s 
determination on this issue will be disturbed only if clearly 
erroneous.”  United States v. Lunsford, No. 95-1507, 1996 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 6552, *4 (6th Cir. Feb. 15, 1996) (unpublished) (citations 
omitted).   
221. State v. Sweet, 2000 ME 14, ¶ 15, 745 A.2d 368, 372-73 
(noting “sentencing court is in a better position to review 
aggravating and mitigating factors”). 
222. Id. ¶¶ 10, 13, 745 A.2d at 372 (acknowledging that 
sentencing process is complex and sentencing court is tasked with 
attempting to accomplish several goals). 
223. 15 M.R.S.A. § 2152 (2005). 
224. See generally Daniel E. Wathen, Judges on Judging:  Making 
Law the Old Fashioned Way -- One Case at a Time, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 
612, 619-20 (1991) (discussing the limited number of sentencing 
appeals granted in Maine). 
225. State v. Hallowell, 577 A.2d 778, 781 (Me. 1990) (“It is 
not enough that the members of this court might have passed a 
different sentence, rather it is only when a sentence appears to err 
in principle that we will alter it.”).  
226. State v. Hewey, 622 A.2d 1151, 1155 (Me. 1993). 
227. Id. 
228. State v. Sweet, 2000 ME 14, ¶ 22, 745 A.2d 368, 373.  
Moreover, any appellate review must be guided by (1) the opportunity 
to provide for the correction of sentences, (2) the need to promote 
respect for the law, (3) the need to “facilitate the possible 
rehabilitation of an offender[,]” and (4) the chance to promote the 
sentencing court’s adherence to applicable sentencing criteria.  15 
M.R.S.A. § 2154 (2005).  
229. One example is the so-called Sensenbrenner bill.  
Defending America’s Most Vulnerable: Safe Access to Drug Treatment 
and Child Protection Act of 2004, H.R. 4547, 108th Cong. (2004).  
Although the bill is purportedly a measure to promote drug treatment 
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while protecting children, it actually includes sweepingly harsh 
mandatory minimum sentences for a wide range of drug crimes.  For 
example, the bill as written would, inter alia, impose the following 
penalties:  (1) a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence upon  a person 
older than twenty-one who sells any quantity of any controlled 
substance to a person younger than eighteen; (2) a life sentence 
upon individuals twenty-one years or older who are convicted a 
second time of distributing drugs to a person under eighteen; and 
(3) an increase of the federal mandatory minimum sentence for the 
sale of any type of controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a 
school, college, public library, drug treatment facility, or 
private/public daycare facilities, to five years.   
